Christian tradition has uniformly both (1) rejected Aristotle’s eternity of matter and (2) insisted on creation ex nihilo rather than creation from pre-existing matter.
Thank you Fr. For I have actually have been meditating on this very issue for a while, especially in some posts here where I was arguing, or trying to, a very similar point. There is in Aquinas an attempt to account properly for creation but his reliance on Aristotle renders him speaking of what is essentially an eternal substrate (prime matter) without offering an explanation for its existence. Ultimately, I wonder if in part this isn’t partly just a problem inherent to a metaphysics that doesn’t start from an apophatic stance which acknowledges that God is, in himself, beyond being. This allows Maximus to call Being itself an eternal work of God and separate eternal works from temporal one’s—even if they are read as an act in two modes as Jordan Daniel Wood does—I wonder if without this framing of things, essentially one which acknowledges the essence energies distinction, if we don’t end up with the impossibility of true deification and Theosis. The more we become God the more we seem to lose our self or essence and end in pantheism.
Thanks for your insightful comment, Nicholas. I do think we need the essence-energies distinction, which allows for participation in divine being (with God's essence remaining 'beyond being,' as you suggest). God gives of himself (i.e., of his being) in creating the world. No need for any further substratum of matter. Re. Maximus, he fits in with this only partially, since (unlike Gregory of Nyssa) he did hold to the existence of matter. I would not use the language of losing oneself or one's essence. I think we become *more* ourselves, the deeper we enter into Christ, the Logos of God, and the more we participate in the divine energies. Our true identity is in the eschaton, in Christ, where our eternal well-being is found (to use Maximus's language). I think this is panentheism, not pantheism, since the beyond-being God always remains utterly transcendent from deified created being. I hope this is somewhat helpful. I give much more detailed explanations of the above in a forthcoming book tentatively titled "Theophanizing Love" (Eerdmans), which I am in the process of finishing up.
I just finished the paper attached in this post: "Participatory Metaphysics and Creation Out of God" from the Heythrop Journal. To anyone reading this who hasn't read the paper, stop and go read it! It is both clear and concise in tackling an issue of great importance to Christian theology.
Prof. Boersma, I am completely in agreement with your assessment of the problems of western philosophical theology (though I think the problem can be identified at least as early as Anselm) and heartily endorse the theology of participation you outline in the paper. As I was reading, a few questions came up for me:
1) how would you characterize the impacts of this metaphysics for the doctrine of the Incarnation? As you point out in the piece, this kind of theo-monism was essential to Cappadocian thought on the subject, but I can imagine some worrying that a theology of participation might somehow damage the specialness or uniqueness of Christ as *the* Incarnation. I have my own thoughts on this (Christ as the "first fruits", God being "all in all", "God became human that humans might become God", etc.), but I wonder how you would respond to such concerns.
2) do you see your metaphysical position here having implications in the "infernalist" vs. universalist debate? It seems to me that one could argue that, to the extent that any existence at all requires existence within the energies of God, that any Hell-state would have to be temporary and provisional, since otherwise God would be committing to eternally causing-to-be a state which God Godself would, presumably, prefer did not exist. I hasten to add that I do not think that your metaphysics would imply no Hell-state whatsoever (since such a view would have impossible difficulties in navigating the Gospels) but only that such a Hell-state would have to be understood as non-eternal, as well as remedial in character, rather than punitive. But I wonder what you think on this—this seems an issue on which reasonable and faithful people could disagree.
3) I was struck by the way Plotinus understood matter as a privation that was even evil. I have to admit that the Enneads remain on my shelf, unread (and indeed unopened until I looked through the sections you cited in the paper!). But I find Plotinus's understanding of matter in deep tension with the basically monist account of reality that he offers. Did he not perceive his view of matter (well, at least, "sensible" matter) as a sore thumb, introducing at least the appearance of a kind of dualism in his thought?
Thanks very much for your kind comments, Scott. I'm glad you enjoyed the article. (1) The first question is a very good one, and it comes up especially in connection with Jordan Wood's recent book on Maximus, "The Whole Mystery of Christ." I think it's crucial to uphold the uniqueness of Christ, and I think Maximus did. I discuss how it is that we can and should maintain it in my forthcoming book, tentatively titled "Theophany of Love." (2) I do not discuss there the question of universalism, though I think that (unlike Gregory of Nyssa) Maximus was not a universalist. I understand why Christian Platonism leads some to universalism, but I think it's not supported by Scripture or the majority of the Great Tradition. (3) As to Plotinus on matter, I am not sure why he wouldn't have followed other Platonists in rejecting this notion, since such a rejection would have fit well with his overall metaphysic. Perhaps he was just not able to explain how it is that sensible realities can exist without the hypothesis of eternal matter. I think this was the case for Aristotle. Since Christians believe in a personal God, they don't need such an unverifiable substratum.
Thank you Fr. For I have actually have been meditating on this very issue for a while, especially in some posts here where I was arguing, or trying to, a very similar point. There is in Aquinas an attempt to account properly for creation but his reliance on Aristotle renders him speaking of what is essentially an eternal substrate (prime matter) without offering an explanation for its existence. Ultimately, I wonder if in part this isn’t partly just a problem inherent to a metaphysics that doesn’t start from an apophatic stance which acknowledges that God is, in himself, beyond being. This allows Maximus to call Being itself an eternal work of God and separate eternal works from temporal one’s—even if they are read as an act in two modes as Jordan Daniel Wood does—I wonder if without this framing of things, essentially one which acknowledges the essence energies distinction, if we don’t end up with the impossibility of true deification and Theosis. The more we become God the more we seem to lose our self or essence and end in pantheism.
Thanks for your insightful comment, Nicholas. I do think we need the essence-energies distinction, which allows for participation in divine being (with God's essence remaining 'beyond being,' as you suggest). God gives of himself (i.e., of his being) in creating the world. No need for any further substratum of matter. Re. Maximus, he fits in with this only partially, since (unlike Gregory of Nyssa) he did hold to the existence of matter. I would not use the language of losing oneself or one's essence. I think we become *more* ourselves, the deeper we enter into Christ, the Logos of God, and the more we participate in the divine energies. Our true identity is in the eschaton, in Christ, where our eternal well-being is found (to use Maximus's language). I think this is panentheism, not pantheism, since the beyond-being God always remains utterly transcendent from deified created being. I hope this is somewhat helpful. I give much more detailed explanations of the above in a forthcoming book tentatively titled "Theophanizing Love" (Eerdmans), which I am in the process of finishing up.
I look forward to reading it
I just finished the paper attached in this post: "Participatory Metaphysics and Creation Out of God" from the Heythrop Journal. To anyone reading this who hasn't read the paper, stop and go read it! It is both clear and concise in tackling an issue of great importance to Christian theology.
Prof. Boersma, I am completely in agreement with your assessment of the problems of western philosophical theology (though I think the problem can be identified at least as early as Anselm) and heartily endorse the theology of participation you outline in the paper. As I was reading, a few questions came up for me:
1) how would you characterize the impacts of this metaphysics for the doctrine of the Incarnation? As you point out in the piece, this kind of theo-monism was essential to Cappadocian thought on the subject, but I can imagine some worrying that a theology of participation might somehow damage the specialness or uniqueness of Christ as *the* Incarnation. I have my own thoughts on this (Christ as the "first fruits", God being "all in all", "God became human that humans might become God", etc.), but I wonder how you would respond to such concerns.
2) do you see your metaphysical position here having implications in the "infernalist" vs. universalist debate? It seems to me that one could argue that, to the extent that any existence at all requires existence within the energies of God, that any Hell-state would have to be temporary and provisional, since otherwise God would be committing to eternally causing-to-be a state which God Godself would, presumably, prefer did not exist. I hasten to add that I do not think that your metaphysics would imply no Hell-state whatsoever (since such a view would have impossible difficulties in navigating the Gospels) but only that such a Hell-state would have to be understood as non-eternal, as well as remedial in character, rather than punitive. But I wonder what you think on this—this seems an issue on which reasonable and faithful people could disagree.
3) I was struck by the way Plotinus understood matter as a privation that was even evil. I have to admit that the Enneads remain on my shelf, unread (and indeed unopened until I looked through the sections you cited in the paper!). But I find Plotinus's understanding of matter in deep tension with the basically monist account of reality that he offers. Did he not perceive his view of matter (well, at least, "sensible" matter) as a sore thumb, introducing at least the appearance of a kind of dualism in his thought?
Thanks for an excellent paper.
Thanks very much for your kind comments, Scott. I'm glad you enjoyed the article. (1) The first question is a very good one, and it comes up especially in connection with Jordan Wood's recent book on Maximus, "The Whole Mystery of Christ." I think it's crucial to uphold the uniqueness of Christ, and I think Maximus did. I discuss how it is that we can and should maintain it in my forthcoming book, tentatively titled "Theophany of Love." (2) I do not discuss there the question of universalism, though I think that (unlike Gregory of Nyssa) Maximus was not a universalist. I understand why Christian Platonism leads some to universalism, but I think it's not supported by Scripture or the majority of the Great Tradition. (3) As to Plotinus on matter, I am not sure why he wouldn't have followed other Platonists in rejecting this notion, since such a rejection would have fit well with his overall metaphysic. Perhaps he was just not able to explain how it is that sensible realities can exist without the hypothesis of eternal matter. I think this was the case for Aristotle. Since Christians believe in a personal God, they don't need such an unverifiable substratum.